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Clear Statement Rules and the Integrity of Labor
Arbitration
Stephen F. Ross and Roy Eisenhardt*
ABSTRACT
Under the common law, employment contracts are submitted to civil courts to resolve
disputes over interpretation, breach, and remedies. As an alternative, parties in labor
contexts can agree to resolution by an impartial arbitrator, whose decision is reviewed
deferentially by judges. Where employees are subject to rules of a private association,
they are often contractually obligated to submit their claims to an internal association
officer or committee; the common law provides for judicial review more limited than a
civil contract but more searching than is the case for an impartial labor arbitrator.
Recently, the National Football League and its players have gone to federal court in
well‐known disputes concerning employee discipline. Although the collective
bargaining agreement expressly removes these issues from impartial arbitration, the
cases have curiously been litigated as if the league commissioner is an arbitrator. This
Article suggests that this is the wrong standard. It creates an anomaly where a
unionized player’s grounds for review are narrower than a non‐union employee. It
also creates an inevitable incentive for federal judges to distort the deferential rules of
review of labor arbitration designed for expert impartial arbitrators, when reviewing
the decision of a management executive. We discuss the baseline law of private
association and why it is a superior standard of judicial review in these cases.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Within our judicial system, there is a broad spectrum of standards that apply to
judicial review of an initial decision resolving a civil dispute. In a civil action, the
parties may seek review by an appellate court, which will thoroughly examine the
record for mistakes of law and fact.1 As an alternative to the judicial process, parties
often agree to non‐judicial commercial or labor arbitration by an independent
arbitrator. In this context, the losing party retains the right of judicial review.
However, the process is a more‐limited motion to vacate the arbitral award in
federal court.2 In the case of a private association, the member‐parties are bound by
* Ross is Professor of Law and Executive Director, Center for the Study of Sports in Society,
Pennsylvania State University. Eisenhardt is Lecturer in Sports Law, Berkeley Law, University of
California (Berkeley) and former President of the Oakland A’s baseball club. We thank Professors
Doug Allen and Paul Whitehead of the School of Labor and Employment Relations at Penn State for
their critical insights, and Krista Dean for research assistance.
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.
2 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (hereafter “FAA.”); Labor Management Relations Act,
§ 301 (29 U.S. Code § 185). Both statutes are discussed passim.
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agreement to the association’s rules. Generally this involves submission of their
claims to an internal officer or committee. Therefore, in private association cases,
the common law provides the scope for judicial review of actions by the
association’s designated officer or tribunal.3
Each of these categories incorporates a prescribed and different standard of judicial
review, which range from very broad in civil actions, to very narrow in the case of
an appeal from a labor or commercial arbitration decision.4 Falling between these
two extremes is the judicial standard of review for internal decisions of private
associations.
Two recent discipline cases arising under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
between the National Football League (NFL) and its players union (NFLPA) make
the point. The NFLPA sought judicial review of disciplinary action taken by the NFL
Commissioner against these players under the Commissioner’s best interest power.5
The NFL CBA clearly expresses the parties’ explicit intent to remove Commissioner’s
discipline for most types of on‐field conduct and for “conduct detrimental to the
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of football” from the detailed system
of labor arbitration the parties use to resolve other disputes under the CBA.6
See, e.g., Zachariah Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993
(1930). Chafee suggests the standard for judicial review of a private association as (i) the rules and
proceedings must not be contrary to natural justice; (2) the expulsion must have been in accordance with
the rules; (3) the proceedings must have been free from malice (bad faith).
4 This specific aspect of the judicial role in labor arbitrations was established in United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). Enterprise Wheel & Car was
announced the same day as two other important decisions stressing the Court’s deference to
impartial and independent labor arbitrators, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Amer. Mfg. Co., er. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). These three
cases are referred to as the “Steelworkers Trilogy.” See, e.g., AT&T Techs. v. Communs. Workers of
Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
5 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d. Cir.,
2016) [hereinafter Brady]; Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n on behalf of Peterson v. Nat’l Football
League, 831 F.3d 985 (8th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Peterson]. .This “best interest” power is
established in Section 8.13A of the NFL Constitution, and applies to all members of the NFL: Owners,
employees, officials, and players. For the exercise of this power against a player, the Commissioner is
constrained by the provisions of Article 46 of the 2011 NFL‐CBA.
6 Articles 43 and 44 of the NFL CBA set forth a typical labor arbitration regime utilizing an
independent arbitrator. In contrast, Art. 46, §1(a) does not. Article 46 provides that
“Notwithstanding anything stated in Article 43... all disputes involving a fine or suspension for
conduct on the playing field [except for distinctive procures for unnecessary roughness or
unsportsmanlike conduct on the field] or involving action taken against a player by the
Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of
football, will be processed exclusively as follows . . . ” To summarize the special process that ensues
under Art. 46, the initial disciplinary hearing is customarily held before the Commissioner; if the
player elects to “appeal,” the player’s “appeal” is not to an independent arbitrator, but to a “Hearing
Officer” designated by the Commissioner. Often, as in Brady, the Commissioner serves as the hearing
officer in review of his own decision. In other cases, as in Peterson, the Commissioner designated the
former NFL Vice President for Labor Relations, Harold Henderson, as the hearing officer. In a recent
disciplinary hearing, In re the Matter of Ray Rice (Nov. 28, 2014), available at
ESPN.com\pdf\141128_rice‐summary, the Commissioner appointed a retired trial judge to hear the
3
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Nonetheless, as the Peterson and Brady cases demonstrate, the NFLPA routinely
frames the motion to vacate in federal court under the very narrow standard
appropriate to judicial review of an independent labor arbitrator.7 In our view,
application of this narrow standard of judicial review is the wrong standard of
review for Commissioner discipline against a player taken pursuant to Article 46.
This is not just a technical distinction. The choice of the wrong standard of review
for Article 46 discipline has several ramifications. First, to treat the Commissioner’s
judgment as equivalent to the award by a labor arbitrator results in an unjustified
anomaly: Courts review discipline of team owners and other non‐union league
employees under the state law of private associations.8 However, when the NFLPA
files a motion for vacatur under independent labor arbitration standards, the player
is limited to a more narrow scope of judicial review than team owners or non‐union
employees for what could be the same or similar offense. 9 Second, perhaps more
importantly, the utilization of the wrong process distorts the law of labor arbitral
review, presenting ongoing risks to that important body of law which extends
beyond the NFL. If parties collectively bargain to exclude a management decision
from review by an independent arbitrator, then judicial review should respect that
clear statement of intent, and apply the law of private associations otherwise
applicable to non‐union individuals subject to the private association’s rules.
The recent decisions involving famous NFL stars Adrian Peterson of the Minnesota
Vikings and Tom Brady of the New England Patriots illustrate the problem. Both
were disciplined by Commissioner Roger Goodell for misconduct under Article 46.
The discipline was unsuccessfully appealed pursuant to internal appeal provisions
specified in that Article. In both of these cases, the NFLPA, on behalf of the player,
sought judicial review under both section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA)10 and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),11 to vacate the “arbitration”
decision by the Commissioner. Consistent with the pleadings, the court opinions at
player appeal, as the Commissioner’s testimony was essential to the merits on appeal. For similar
reasons, in the famous “Bountygate” discipline, In the Matter of New Orleans Saints Pay‐for
Performance/ “Bounty” (Dec. 11, 2012), available at http:\\amp.nfl.com, the Commissioner appointed
the previous Commissioner, Paul Tagliabue, as the hearing officer to hear the players’ appeals.
7 See NFLPA v. NFLMC (Peterson), 88 F.Supp.3d 1084, 1089 (2015) ( “the NFLPA filed a petition to
vacate the arbitration award under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
185 (LMRA) and Section10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (FAA). The trial court,
consistent with this petition, considered its standard of review under these two acts. See also NFLMC
v. NFLPA (Brady), 125 F.Supp.3d 449, 449 (S.D.N.Y.2015) (trial court states that the NFLPA and NFL,
on cross motions, argued their respective positions “pursuant to Section 301 of the [LMRA] and
Section 10 of the [FAA].”)
8

The governing law for the NFL‐CBA is New York. See Article 70 of the 2011 CBA. For general
discussion of owner discipline under private association law, see discussion accompanying notes ___
infra.
9 See discussion accompanying notes ___, infra.
10 29 U.S.C. § 141, Pub. L. No. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
11 9 U.S.C. §§ 1‐14, Pub. L. No. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947).
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both the district court and appeals court levels treated the case as seeking judicial
review of the disciplinary decision by a labor arbitrator. Both district courts vacated
the Commissioner’s discipline.12 The district judges, in rendering judgment, were
clearly cognizant of the fact that the discipline under review was not that upheld by
an independent expert arbitrator, but of a management executive.13 Both appellate
courts reversed the district court decisions, based on the narrow guardrails
imposed on judicial review by Steelworkers Trilogy.14 For example, the Second
Circuit, in describing the Article 46 appeal process, characterized it as an
arbitration, even though the CBA, by its language, clearly withdraws t he review
under Article 46 from the independent arbitrator paradigm: “Brady requested
arbitration and League Commissioner Roger Goodell, serving as arbitrator, entered
an award confirming the discipline.”15
In our view, the standards specified in the LMRA and the FAA are not the correct
standards for judges to review a decision expressly withdrawn from arbitration. The
district courts engaged in a strained application of these standards, in order to
vacate the Commissioner’s “arbitral award,” and were reversed by the courts of
appeal. The application of these arbitration standards to review a matter of
management discretion threatens the integrity of the arbitral process. The
collective bargaining agreement should be interpreted in the straightforward way
typical of non‐sports agreements where a matter is clearly removed from review by
independent arbitration. That is, where the decision is removed from arbitration
and left to management, then affected parties are left with the same rights as they
would have in the absence of collective bargaining, under the common law. To be
sure, NFL owners and players are free to effectuate federal labor policy by altering
this presumption, but they should be required to do so explicitly.16
The Article suggests that courts should presume that, when a matter is clearly
removed from arbitration, the Steelworkers Trilogy and FAA standards for judicial
review do not apply. These standards are designed for independent expert
arbitrators, not unilateral decisions by one of the parties. Absent text that explicitly
incorporates these standards into the collective bargain, where the NFLPA and
players seek review in federal court of a disciplinary decision by the Commissioner
that has been removed from impartial arbitration by the parties, they should plead
for relief under the principles of judicial review that would apply under the law
governing private associations. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
should apply those standards, as they would in the case of discipline directed at an
12

13

See note 8, supra.

Id.

Brady, 820 F.3d at 537; Peterson, 831 F.3d at 993‐94. The cases comprising the Trilogy are cited
supra note ___.
15 820 F.3d at 537.
16 The review by the Commissioner of his own discipline under Article 46 has existed since the first
NFL‐CBA in 1968. The full document may be found at the Sports Lawyers Association website,
https://www.sportslaw.org/members/secureDocument.cfm?docID=985 (last visited March 1, 2017).
14
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owner or non‐union employee. Applying the appropriate standard will not be
outcome determinative in all cases, but will focus the reviewing court on different
issues and, in some cases, will give the courts broader leeway to overturn a decision
that is arbitrary or contrary to established league practices.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II lays out the common law baseline for
judicial review of decisions by a sports league commissioner, in the absence of labor
law and collective bargaining. Precedents regarding sports leagues and similar
associations hold that association officials enjoy wide discretion, but that courts will
reverse actions that exceed delegated authority, are wholly lacking in evidence, are
arbitrary or capricious, or are contrary to established association rules. Part III sets
forth the statutory overlay of labor law and its preference for arbitration, while
emphasizing that the overarching policy of freedom of contract between unions and
management is not unlimited. In Part IV, we apply these principles in the context of
sports arbitration, with emphasis on the role of clear statement rules in interpreting
both relevant statutes as well as collective bargains. Part V articulates our thesis
that specific principles of review of impartial labor arbitrators should not be applied
to other forms of dispute resolution, particularly when the language in the collective
bargaining agreement expressly excludes impartial arbitration of a management
decision. Rather, courts faced with disciplinary decisions that are withdrawn from
impartial arbitration should review them, under their common law powers, either
applying specific standards set forth in the collective bargaining agreement or
applying the general standards for review that would be applicable to non‐union
employees or management officials. We discuss this approach to two recent sports
disciplinary cases of owners.
II.

THE COMMON LAW AND THE SPORTS LEAGUE COMMISSIONER

At common law, absent specific language in a contract, employment is “at will.”
Workers can quit at any time. Employers can fire workers for any reason at any
time.17
Employers and workers are, however, allowed to enter into enforceable contracts
governing the terms of employment. The contract can specify terms of discipline
and grounds for dismissal, and provide each party with remedies in case of breach.
Disputes are resolved in civil litigation before judges.18 Significantly, on grounds of
public policy at common law, courts refused to not enforce provisions that purport
to waive access to courts to resolve disputes.19
Judicial review is circumscribed, however, when the decision is one designated by a
private association based on private agreement. Where the rules of a private
association provide for internal resolution of disputes, judicial review is limited for
2 Emp. L. Deskbook Hum. Resources Prof. § 34:2
Id.
19 See, e.g., Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553, 557 (Ala. 1979).
17
18

6
social organizations (such as fraternal organizations), ecclesiastical organizations
(such as churches, synagogues, or mosques) or business associations (such as
medical groups or homeowners associations). Under the common law of private
association, however, courts retain the authority to reverse association officers’
decisions if the decision either (a) exceeds their delegated authority; (b) lacks any
evidence in support; or (c) is contrary to the association’s by‐laws or rules.20
Judicial review of private association decisions varies based on the nature of the
particular organization and the degree of harm arising from discipline or
expulsion.21 Where an association exercises a degree of control in an industry to
preclude those subjected to discipline from engaging in their chosen profession,
review is significantly closer than where the discipline is from a fraternal or social
organization,22 where the plaintiff can choose to affiliate with other private
associations, and where the defendant’s interest in choosing with whom to associate
is greater.
Major American professional sports are organized as private associations comprised
of the clubs that participate in the competition.23 Each of these associations have a
governing document, called a league constitution, and all major professional sports
follow the model created by baseball in the 1920s of creating the office of the
Commissioner, selected by the owners with significant job security, and granted
broad powers to take actions to discipline those within the game for conduct
detrimental to the “best interests” of the game. 24 Distinctively from this “best
interests” power, league constitutions also provide that the Commissioner “shall
have full, complete, and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate” disputes
between stakeholders within the league.25 This reflects the unique role of the
commissioner of sports league. Discipline regarding the integrity or the “best
interests” of the entire sport must be industry‐wide, not just for a single employer.
History has shown the need for a single commissioner with regard to special
integrity needs of sporting competitions.26 The arbitration power reflects related
but distinct concerns about providing a quick, efficient non‐judicial system for
resolving internal disputes.27

Chafee, supra note __, at __.
Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc., 62 N.J. Super. 184, 196 (1960).
22 Id. at 198.
23 Technically, the NHL is a 501(c)(6) tax‐exempt organization. The NFL was also a 501(c)(6) until
2014, when it abandoned that classification and became an unincorporated association. Major
League Baseball opted to forego its 501(c)(6) status in 2007. The principal exception is NASCAR, a
private company that organizes the premier stock car racing competition, where racing teams have
separate “vertical” contracts. See generally Stephen F. Ross and Stefan Szymanski, Fans of the World,
Unite! A (Capitalist) Manifesto for Sports Consumers (2008), chapter 4.
24 On the origin of the system, see Eliot Asinof, Eight Men Out: The Black Sox and the 1919 World
Series (2000). The NFL Constitutional delegation is typical. NFL Const. Art. 8.13(a).
25 See, e.g., NFL Const. Art. 8.3.
26 Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner and an
Alternative Approach From a Corporate Perspective, 6 Marq. Sports L.J. 65, 70 (1995)..
27 Id
20
21

7
Two sports cases illustrate and apply these principles. Finley v. Kuhn28 was a
challenge to a decision by the Commissioner of Baseball disapproving three
agreements whereby the Oakland Athletics sold the contracts of three star players
to the New York Yankees and the Boston Red Sox. The court upheld the decision as
within the Commissioner’s broad authority to take action to prevent conduct
“inconsistent with the best interests of baseball.” As to this judgment, the court was
extremely deferential. The court explained that baseball “cannot be analogized to
any other business” and standards like “the best interests of baseball” were not
“familiar to courts and obviously require some expertise in their application.”29
The Seventh Circuit expressly considered a provision in the Major League
Agreement that provides that all clubs agreed to be bound by the Commissioner’s
decision and to waive recourse to courts. However, it refused to read the provision
literally. Instead, the court applied Illinois law.30 That law conforms to well‐
recognized principles of deference under the law of private associations. The court
ruled that:
[T]he waiver of recourse clause contested here seems to add little if anything
to the common law non‐reviewability of private association actions. This
clause can be upheld as coinciding with the common law standard disallowing
court interference. We view its inclusion in the Major League Agreement
merely as a manifestation of the intent of the contracting parties to insulate
from review decisions made by the Commissioner concerning the subject
matter of actions taken in accordance with his grant of powers.31
Thus, the court further reasoned, the clause does not foreclose access to courts
under all circumstances. Exceptions to judicial deference exist:
1) where the rules, regulations or judgments of the association are in
contravention to the laws of the land or in disregard of the charter or bylaws
of the association, or
2) where the association has failed to follow the basic rudiments of due
process of law. 32

569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 537.
30 As the court’s jurisdiction was based on diversity, it faced a decision as to choice of applicable state
law. The original Major League Agreement was signed in Chicago in 1921, so Illinois seemed the
appropriate choice. The court then commented as follows on the applicable law: “Oakland has urged
us to apply the substantive law dealing with the “policies and rules of a private association” to the
Major League Agreement and actions taken thereunder. Illinois has developed a considerable body of
law dealing with the activities of private voluntary organizations and we agree that the validity and
effect of the waiver of recourse clause should initially be tested under these decisions.” Id. at 543.
The current Major League Constitution, adopted in 2005, lacks a governing law provision, so
presumably faced with this question again, a court would apply Illinois law.
31 Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
32 Id. at 544.
28
29
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Indeed, the court specifically considered and rejected, as lacking sufficient evidence,
Finley’s claim that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, or motivated by
“malice, ill will, or anything other than the Commissioner’s good faith judgment that
these attempted [contract] assignments were not in the best interests of baseball.”33
The distinction between impartial arbitration and judicial review under the law of
private association is also illustrated by Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v.
Kuhn (“Turner”).34 One of the responsibilities of sports league commissioners is to
enforce standards against “tampering” with players still under contract to other
clubs. Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn found that Atlanta Braves owner Ted
Turner had violated this standard and imposed sanctions. Subsequently, at a
cocktail party with media present, Turner told San Francisco Giants’ owner Bob
Lurie that the Braves would outbid the Giants for the services of star centerfielder
Gary Matthews. Eventually, Matthews signed with the Braves. After a hearing,
Commissioner Kuhn found that Turner’s repeated violation of tampering rules was
“not in the best interests of baseball.” After another hearing, Kuhn imposed
sanctions against the Atlanta club, including suspending Turner for one year and
denying the Braves its first pick in the following summer’s amateur draft.
As in Finley, the judge in Turner refused to read the waiver‐of‐recourse clause in the
Major League Agreement as precluding any judicial review. Of particular relevance
to this Article, the court expressly rejected the claim that the standard for judicial
review of an arbitrator’s decision under the Federal Arbitration Act was applicable
to Kuhn’s decision.35
The court observed that the Commissioner’s disciplinary powers were grounded in
one provision of the Major League Agreement, whilst the Commissioner’s authority
to resolve all “disputes and controversies related in any way to professional baseball
between clubs” is contained in a separate provision.36 Prior precedent supported
the claim that the Commissioner’s arbitral authority did not apply where the dispute
was a disciplinary one generated by the Commissioner himself under his “best
interest” powers. This distinction is well‐illustrated by the Commissioner’s
decision. Had the Commissioner ordered the Braves to pay the Giants a sum of
money, or assigned a player’s contract to the Giants, or given a Braves’ draft pick to
the Giants, then the decision would seem akin to an arbitral award between two
disputants. Instead, by suspending Turner and simply taking away a draft pick, the
decision was clearly of a punitive nature by the Commissioner in the exercise of his
“best interests” authority.37

Id. at 539 n.44.
432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D.Ga. 1977).
35 Id. at 1218.
36 Id. at 1219.
37 Kuhn was precluded from barring the Braves from signing Mathews, as that would most certainly
have provoked a successful grievance from the players association.
33
34
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Turning to the merits of the case, the court upheld the Commissioner’s
determination that Turner’s conduct was contrary to the “best interests of baseball”
and that the sanction of suspension was within the Commissioner’s discretion.
However, the court found the Agreement’s provisions concerning penalties did not
include removal of a draft pick, and given the penal nature of the clause, it was to be
strictly construed.38
In sum, under the common law of private associations, sports league commissioners
enjoy wide discretion to define what constitutes the “best interests” of the sport.
However, courts retain the power of judicial review over commissioner’s decisions
that exceed their delegated authority, are wholly lacking in evidence, are contrary to
established league rules, or those that are arbitrary and capricious.
Based on these precedents, consider what might have occurred if New England
Patriots’ executive Jonathan Kraft (son of owner Robert Kraft), rather than NFLPA
member Tom Brady, had been the one personally subjected to the Commissioner’s
discipline for the alleged deflation of game balls. Judicial review of Commissioner
Goodell’s decision in such a case would have been under private association
standards, whereas the courts reviewed Brady’s discipline under the traditional
standards governing labor arbitrations.39 Absent clear language in a CBA, why
should a player be more limited in his rights to judicial review than a non‐union
employee?
III. THE STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL PREFERENCE FOR INDEPENDENT
ARBITRATION OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
Professional sports athletes followed non‐sports employees in taking advantage of
the National Labor Relations Act to organize collectively.40 As players in the NHL,
NBA, and MLB organized to strengthen their bargaining position regarding wages
and working conditions, one of their top priorities was to secure a collective
bargaining agreement that permitted an independent labor arbitrator to resolve
disputes between players and their employers, or with the commissioner. 41 Under
the labor model, the substantive “law” was the CBA, not the league constitution, and
the dispute resolution mechanism was impartial arbitration, not the law of private
association that designates the Commissioner as the tribune. Under these CBAs,
federal law governing arbitration, rather than the law of private association, now
governs most sports labor disputes.

432 F. Supp. at 1225.
See discussion accompanying note __, infra.
40 The first players’ union to be certified by the NLRB was the NFLPA in 1970, following the assertion
of jurisdiction by the NLRB over professional sports in American League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, 180 NLRB No. 30 (1969).
41 For example, the use of an independent arbitrator was included in the MLB CBA in 1972. The
provision went relatively unnoticed by the owners. Ironically, the ability of the players’ to take the
Messersmith/McNally free‐agency grievance before that arbitrator has changed baseball forever.
38
39
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The NFL bargaining history is different. Since its first CBA in 1968, the independent
arbitration model has been utilized in all aspects of dispute resolution, with the
express exception of the Commissioner’s exercise of the “best interest” power. In
that case, as stated earlier, the Commissioner initially imposes the discipline; if the
player elects to “appeal” that discipline, his recourse is to a hearing officer
designated by the Commissioner. The hearing officer is frequently the
Commissioner himself.42
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Under the common law, agreements to waive recourse to courts were generally
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.43 To facilitate the concept of neutral
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution, in 1926 Congress enacted
the FAA.44 For contracts subject to regulation under Congress’ power to regulate
interstate commerce, the FAA makes valid agreements to submit disputes to binding
arbitration, superseding state laws to the contrary.
The FAA’s theoretical foundation is that parties otherwise competent to make
binding promises are free to make a bargain to abide by the decision of an
arbitrator. 45 Thus, when a judge reviews an arbitral award, the award itself is
presumptively the decision of the parties. Consider a sports illustration: The
provision in the Major League Baseball (MLB) collective bargaining agreement to
arbitrate certain players’ salaries.46 Although an arbitration‐eligible player and his
club did not agree on the salary, the salary awarded by the arbitrator is correctly
understood to reflect the decision of the parties.
The FAA provides important but narrow exceptions. Section 10 provides a federal
court may vacate an award under any of the following provisions:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators . . .
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing . . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the

42

Compare NFL‐CBA 2011 Articles 43 & 46; see text accompanying note 6, supra.
See note ___ supra.
44 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1‐16 (2006).
45 Legislative history reinforces this conclusion. See S. REP. No. 68‐536 (1924) stating:
The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a
defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced.
This exists only when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or when the
arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers or were influenced by other undue
means‐ cases in which enforcement would obviously be unjust. There is no authority and no
opportunity for the court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what the
award should have been.
46 See MLB CBA, Article VI, Section E., available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf
43
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controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have
been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.47
The presumptive validity of arbitral agreements set the stage for their primacy in
resolution of industrial labor disputes. Indeed, courts have acknowledged that the
FAA’s principles are generally incorporated into labor arbitration, although the
process has been not entirely smooth. 48
B. The Labor Management Relations Act and the Steelworkers Trilogy
Having federalized labor policy towards collective bargaining with the passage of
the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, Congress sought to improve the process
for dispute resolution in the 1947 LMRA.49 A critical provision in this regard,
section 301, conferred subject matter jurisdiction in federal courts, replacing state
common law contract rules with a federal common law to enforce and interpret
collective bargaining agreements.50 CBAs generally displace the doctrine of
employment of will at common law, affording workers greater job security than
non‐unionized workers whose employment is not secured by an individually
negotiated contract. Most important for our purposes, section 203(d) of the LMRA
is a statutory declaration that the “desirable method for settlement of grievances”
under a CBA is a “final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties.”51

Title 9 U.S.C. §10. See also dictum in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (overruled on other grounds
in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) suggesting that “manifest
disregard for the law” is a ground for overturning an arbitration decision. See also Hall Street Assoc.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), holding that parties may not expand by agreement on the
standards of review specified in the FAA.
48 See Lisa M. Eaton, Arbitration Agreements in Labor and Employment Contracts: Well Within the
Reach of the FAA, 2002 J. Disp. Resol. 193, 212 (2002); See also Michael LeRoy, Irreconciliable
Differences: The Troubled Marriage of Judicial Review Standards under the Steelworkers Trilogy and
the Federal Arbitration Act, 2010 J. Disp. Resol. 89 (2010).
There is some debate whether the FAA was intended to apply to labor arbitration, turning
particularly on the exclusionary language in section 1 stating “ . . . nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” This was rejected in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
49 29 U.S.C. § 141, Pub. L. No. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
50 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (“Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry. . . , or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.”)
51 See 29 U.S.C. §203(d): “Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.”
47
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The Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in three cases commonly referred to as the
Steelworkers Trilogy provides the authoritative interpretation of these provisions.
The Court interpreted the LMRA to create two clear doctrines. First, in United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., the Court held that federal judges must
defer to the parties’ choice of alternative dispute resolution procedures.52 Second,
in United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,53 the Court held that, where
the parties have chosen impartial arbitration, federal judges must enforce awards
that “draw their essence from the contract.” This second holding reflected the
reality that of all the many promises parties make in a CBA, the most important one
is that all disputes are determined by an arbitrator of their choice, and not by
federal judges.
In explaining these holdings, the Court went far further than was required to carry
out dutifully the congressional declaration to effectuate grievance settlement “by a
method agreed upon by the parties.”54 It discussed at length the many benefits to
labor, management, and the general public of the impartial arbitrator.55 An arbitral
tribunal has greater expertise than federal judges in interpreting a CBA to reflect the
parties’ agreement and to facilitate the parties’ ongoing relationship. In addition,
labor arbitration promotes labor peace. It is quicker and cheaper than federal court
litigation, and the parties are more likely to move forward constructively after a
decision by an arbitrator of their choice. As Justice Douglas observed, whereas
arbitration in effect substitutes for litigation in commercial disputes, in labor
disputes it often substitutes for strikes and lockouts.56
These standards are premised on a fundamental policy assumption concerning the
independence, neutrality and expertise of the arbitrator.57 For example, Justice
Douglas states in the Enterprise Wheel opinion:

52 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (reversing lower court’s refusal to defer to arbitrator regarding a non‐
meritorious claim).
53 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (reversing lower court’s set‐aside of an arbitral award because of its
disagreement with the merits of the arbitrator’s decision).
54 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1947).
55 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580‐82.
56 Id. at 578.
57 None of the three Steelworkers opinions refers to the Federal Arbitration Act, nor addresses the
question whether the standards under section 10 under that act are congruent with the subjective
standards articulated in Steelworkers. The two cases that are the centerpiece for this article, Peterson
and Brady, utilize both Steelworkers and the FAA interchangeably. The district court in Peterson
recognized the issue, and stated:

For purposes of this case, the standard of review under the LMRA and the FAA is the same.
Courts give decisions by labor arbitrators “substantial deference.” “The federal labor laws
‘reflect a decided preference for private settlement of labor disputes.’ ” Therefore, “as long as
the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the [CBA] and acting within the scope of
his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn
his decision.”
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When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to
reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when it comes to
formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide
variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what specific
remedy should be awarded to meet a particular contingency.58
To implement this rationale, the Court adopted a clear statement rule to enforce the
first of their clear doctrines established in Warrior & Gulf: arbitration is enforced,
unless the parties “evince a most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude” the
dispute from arbitration.”59 The Court’s adoption of this clear statement rule is
important. This holding is not consistent with a strict and literal reading of section
203(d). Consider a CBA that contains ambiguous language suggesting that certain
disputes may not be subject to arbitration. Literally, the statutory command for a
federal judge to implement the method of dispute resolution “agreed to by the
parties” would require the judge, in cases of ambiguous text, to explore other
evidence of the parties’ intent, and enforce the method which the judge determines
is most probably the parties’ choice. However, Steelworkers Trilogy instead
instructs judges to forego this inquiry and find a matter to be arbitrable unless the
parties have clearly stated that it is not.
To further the second clear doctrine, established in Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., the
Court held that judicial challenges to arbitral awards would be narrowly
circumscribed. To secure judicial relief, parties would need to demonstrate clear
bias, fundamental procedural unfairness, or that the award disregarded the
“essence” of the parties’ collective bargain in favor of the arbitrator’s “own brand of

National Football League Player’s Ass’n v. National Football League, 88 F.Supp. 3d 1084, 1089 (D.
Minn. 2015). This position is consistent with Oxford Health Systems v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013)
which suggests the standards under both are essentially the same, even in a non‐labor arbitration:
“Here, Oxford invokes § 10(a)(4) of the Act, which authorizes a federal court to set aside an arbitral
award “where the arbitrator[ ] exceeded [his] powers.” A party seeking relief under that provision
bears a heavy burden.“It is not enough ... to show that the [arbitrator] committed an error—or even a
serious error.” Id. at 2068, quoting Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 671(2010). Because the parties “bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement,”
an arbitral decision “even arguably construing or applying the contract” must stand, regardless of a
court's view of its (de)merits. “ Oxford Health, 133 S.Ct. at 2068. Only if the arbitrator acts outside
the scope of his contractually delegated authority —issuing an award that “simply reflect[s][his] own
notions of [economic] justice” rather than “draw[ing] its essence from the contract”—may a court
overturn his determination. Id. at 2068, quoting from United Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL‐CIO
v, Misco Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (“But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or
applying the contract and acting within the scope his authority, that a court is convinced he
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”) The Court emphasized that “the
sole question for us is whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties' contract, not
whether he got its meaning right or wrong.” Oxford Health, 133 S.Ct. at 2068
58 363 U.S. at 597.
59 Id. at 585.
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industrial justice.” 60 Alas, lower courts continue to ignore the Court’s instructions
to restrain their impulse to second‐guess impartial arbitrators,61 even though, as a
court of appeals correctly interpreted Steelworkers Trilogy, awards cannot be set
aside because the arbitrator “erred in interpreting the contract” or “clearly erred” or
“grossly erred,” as long as they actually interpreted the CBA.62
C. Limits to freedom of contract
A fundamental principle of labor relations law is that an employer and the workers’
chosen union should be able to fashion an agreement on wages, hours, and working
conditions based on free choice. The congressional policy promoting regulation of
labor through collective bargaining is facilitated, logic and experience suggest, when
parties can reach their own bargains. External limits on free contract require the
parties to forego the most efficient bargain, as they work around the external
limitation. Because this increases the difficulty of agreement, it increases the
likelihood of impasse, strikes and lockouts. 63
However, there are many exceptions to this important foundational principle.
Union and management cannot agree to waive rights that workers have under
related federal employment laws, such as minimum wages, maximum hours, or
occupational health and safety regulations.64 There are likely many examples of
industrial bargains that would be facilitated if unions could waive specific safety
standards, that might not necessarily be essential to their particular industry, in
return for other favorable management concessions, but this exception precludes
this possibility. Labor law also precludes unions from reaching agreements that
breach its duty of fair representation to all workers in the bargaining unit.
In addition, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has created other
exceptions, in the exercise of its delegated discretion to effectuate the statutory
requirement that parties bargain “in good faith.” One example that directly limits
freedom of contract is the doctrine regarding creation and termination of multi‐
employer bargaining. The Supreme Court has upheld Board decisions that, when
parties have voluntarily agreed to commence bargaining on a multi‐employer basis,
neither the union nor individual employers can withdraw until the end of a
“bargaining cycle.”65 For example, in the leading Board precedent, the parties were
at an impasse with possible industrial action and the union sought to shift
approaches by reaching a satisfactory agreement with one of the four employers
363 U.S. at 597.
Robert A. Gorman and Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Law: Unionization and Collective Bargaining,
§25.1, 817 (2d ed. 2004).
62 Hill v. Norfolk & West. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194 (7th Cir. 1987).
63 Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
64 See, e.g., Allis‐Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211‐12 (1985) (“Clearly, §301 does not grant
the parties to a [CBA] the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law”).
65 Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982), citing with approval Retail
Associates, Inc., 120 N. L. R. B. 388 (1958).
60
61
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with whom they were negotiating. The Board held that this could not take place
until an appropriate time in the negotiation, with a finding that the union
withdrawal was “a sincere abandonment, with relative permanency, of the
multiemployer unit and the embracement of a different course of bargaining on an
individual‐employer basis.”66
In sum, although labor law generally seeks to fulfill the mutually‐agreed desires of
labor and management, there are multiple exceptions that may preclude or impair
this goal. In some cases, freedom of contract is explicitly limited, sometimes it is
implicitly limited, and in other cases, such as the Steelworkers Trilogy, freedom of
contract is supplemented by the requirement of clear statement. If the parties fail to
state their intent clearly with respect to arbitration, the presumption is in favor of
arbitration.
D. Implication of Steelworkers: The independent integrity of the arbitral
process.
The body of precedent beginning with the pathmaking decisions in the Steelworkers
Trilogy make clear that judicial interpretation favoring labor arbitration is driven by
policies that the Supreme Court favors and perceives are shared by Congress and
the NLRB. As Professor Roger I. Abrams has argued, “freedom to operate without
legal intrusion but with considerable legal support devolves upon the participants ‐
‐ union, management, and arbitrators ‐‐ a responsibility to ensure that labor
arbitration effectuates national policy.”67 Because federal courts will enforce no‐
strike promises in collective bargains, and will not substantively review the
correctness of an arbitral award, Abrams observes that, with “the courts and the
streets now foreclosed, the contract rights of the working person must find
protection in the forum of arbitration or be lost.”68
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., the Supreme Court noted that a final and
binding arbitration award was vulnerable if tainted by the union’s breach of its duty
of fair representation to its workers. If "contractual processes have been seriously
flawed," the "integrity of the arbitral process" has been undermined. The Court
reasoned that although Congress “has put its blessing on private dispute settlement
arrangements provided in collective agreements,” it presumed “that contractual
machinery would operate within some minimum levels of integrity."69 As Abrams
notes, this holding means that the “preferred status of labor arbitration is thus not
immutable.”70 He notes that courts can easily impose core principles of arbitral
integrity under the federal common law of labor arbitration established by section
301 of the LMRA.71
Retail Associates, 120 N.L.R.B. at 394.
Roger I. Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 231, 235 (1977).
68 Id. at 236.
69 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
70 Abrams, supra note __, at 235.
71 Id. at 263.
66
67
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The Court clearly favors arbitration for reasons other than a commitment to laissez
faire freedom of contract. A libertarian approach would overturn the common law
entirely and permit parties to simply waive access to courts in lieu of impartial
arbitration. Such an approach would direct courts to enforce the apparent intent of
the parties, rather than presuming that the parties intended to resolve disputes
before an impartial arbitrator absent clear evidence to the contrary. Rather,
Steelworkers Trilogy articulates the substantive values of independent arbitration
that warrant legislative, administrative, and judicial support. These values include
the fact that the arbitrator, as the chosen instrument of the parties, is assumed to be
controlled by their agreement and no other forces. The Court recognized that goals
of collective bargaining and labor peace are served when union and management
can rely on an arbitrator’s “informed practical solution of a dispute they could not
resolve themselves.” 72 Another significant value of independent arbitration is that
parties tend to view the totality of arbitral decisions and acceptably based on the
terms to which they agreed.
Of course, parties often take advantage of the primacy of voluntary bargaining to
withdraw a matter from impartial arbitration, using clear language to do so. A
common practice is to make it clear that a matter otherwise subject to arbitration
would instead be reserved as a matter of management discretion (or, in certain
context, union discretion). Occasionally, in an extreme form of Justice Brandeis’
insight that it is more important for a matter to be settled than settled correctly,73
unsuccessful mediation efforts conclude with a coin flip. In some contexts,
recognizing the primacy of the overall labor relationship results in a specialized
tribunal equally divided between management and labor, who are expected to
resolve multiple industrial disputes through bargaining and accommodation.74
Policies supporting freedom of contract permit parties to a collective bargain, if they
so choose, to reject these general principles and to resolve disputes by means other
than impartial arbitration. But because impartial arbitration serves these worthy
values, the parties must do so clearly and unequivocally.
IV. THE ROLE OF CLEAR STATEMENT IN SPORTS ARBITRATION
A sports arbitral award transformed both baseball, and eventually modern labor
relations in sports, by ending a decades‐long agreement among baseball owners not
to compete for the services of players at the expiration of their contract. Both the
decision by a veteran arbitrator and the limited judicial review of that decision by
federal courts demonstrate the role that clear statement rules serve in labor
relations. The conclusion is inescapable that these rules largely preserve the ability
Id. at 236.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74 My thanks to Professor Paul Whitehead for these examples from his experience as General Counsel
to the United Steelworkers of America.
72
73
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of collective bargaining participants to craft results they want. However, judicially‐
created rules of clear statement allow judges to favor certain results and disfavor
others.
In Messersmith/McNally,75 the arbitrator interpreted the collectively bargained
uniform player contract ‐‐ which explicitly stated the Club “may renew this contract
for the period of one year on the same terms” – to preclude the repeated exercise of
this renewal right. As a result, after one year, the player was completely free to
receive competing bids from other baseball clubs.
This radical departure from past practice would not have been achieved had the
arbitrator relied on techniques of contract interpretation primarily designed to
achieve the most likely intent of the parties. The literal language supported the
owners’ interpretation that the right could be perpetually exercised by the club.
Prior practice suggested that the parties understood the contract to permit
perpetual renewals, as evidenced by antitrust litigation funded by the players’
association that had challenged what was alleged as an owners’ agreement to
refrain from competing for player services perpetually.76 Assuming (likely
correctly) that the negotiating parties were familiar with the interpretive precepts
established by the Restatement of Contracts,77 the arbitrator could have found,
alternatively, that even if the parties attached different meanings to a term, the term
should be construed in accordance with the meaning attached by the owners,
because at the time the agreement was made, the owners did not know the players
believed that the term permitted free agency after one renewal year, whilst the
players knew that the owners interpreted the term as granting a perpetual right of
renewal.
Instead, the arbitral decision was based on a principal of clear statement. The
arbitrator relied on an interpretive canon requiring perpetual options to be
express.78 The result could also have been justified based on a related clear
statement canon, contra preferendum, that requires ambiguities to be interpreted
against the party who drafted them.79
Because of the major implications of this pathbreaking decision, the owners sought
a federal court judgment vacating the arbitral award in Kansas City Royals v. MLB
Players Ass’n.80 Aware that Steelworkers Trilogy precludes careful judicial review of
an arbitrator’s contract interpretation, management counsel surely realized that
Messersmith/McNallyGrievance Arbitration, 66 Labor Arbitration Reporter 101(1975).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
77 Rest. of Contracts §201 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981) .
78 Messersmith, 66 Lab. Arb. R. at 113‐14.
79 Rest. (2d) of Contracts, §206. For a critique of these techniques in the context of interpreting a
collective bargaining agreement between two sophisticated parties, see Roger I. Abrams, Liberation
Arbitration: The Baseball Reserve Clause Case, in Proceedings of the 55th Annual Meeting of the
National Academy of Arbitrators 192 (2002).
80 532 F.2d 615 (1976).
75
76
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they would be unlikely to persuade a federal judge to accept their challenge as a
matter of contract law to the arbitrator’s judgment that a rule of clear statement
applied to perpetual contracts, and that instead he should have relied on the literal
meaning of the text or their contested view of the parties’ intent. Indeed, the court
of appeals had little difficulty upholding this aspect of the award.
A more significant challenge was the owners’ argument that the dispute was not
arbitrable. The collective bargaining agreement explicitly stated that it did “not deal
with the reserve system” featuring no competition for player services. The court
rejected this argument as well, but reviewed the question of arbitrability de novo.
However, in upholding the arbitrability of the grievance filed by players Andy
Messersmith and Dave McNally, the court of appeals’ review was not based on
whether it was more probable than not that the parties intended to arbitrate.
Rather, applying Steelworkers Trilogy, the applicable test is whether “the record
evinces the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the grievances from
arbitration.”81
In sum, the court refused to determine for itself whether, as the LMRA literally
requires, arbitration was the final method of dispute resolution of the parties.
Rather, “what a reasonable party might be expected to do cannot take precedence of
what the parties actually provided for in their collective bargaining agreement.”82
Because the agreement did not explicitly demonstrate a clear intent to remove the
matter from arbitration, and because federal courts believe that independent
arbitration serves many benefits, the courts would enforce the arbitral award.
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SPORTS COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE IN THE
ABSENCE OF INDEPENDENT ARBITRATION
The foregoing analysis yields the following conclusions about the proper scope of
judicial review of disputes between unionized players and the league commissioner
over disciplinary issues. Each sports league’s collective bargaining agreement has
provisions for impartial grievance arbitration. Absent clear intent to exclude a
matter from impartial arbitration, the individual(s) chosen by the parties for this
purpose has jurisdiction, and the resulting arbitral award is subject to deferential
judicial review under the FAA and Steelworkers Trilogy standards, subject to vacatur
only if judges are persuaded that the award did not draw its essence from the
agreement but was instead the arbitrator’s personal imposition of industrial justice.
Moreover, absent clear and express language, sports agreements should not be read
to give players significantly fewer rights than non‐unionized league employees and
owners.83
Id. at 621.
Id. at 630.
83 A decision that superficially bears on this analysis is State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 120 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1086 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). The court held that a provision in the contract between
the St. Louis Rams and its non‐union equipment manager, which provided that all disputes would be
resolved by the Commissioner, was unconscionable because of the Commissioner’s bias as an
81
82
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Each sports leagues’ CBA, to varying degrees, does explicitly demonstrate a clear
intent that certain matters are not subject to impartial arbitration, but reserved for
the commissioner or his designee. The NFL CBA, similar to the other professional
sports, provides that disputes between the parties “will be resolved exclusively” by
a procedure of impartial arbitration, “except wherever another method of dispute
resolution is set forth elsewhere in this Agreement.”84 However, pursuant to that
last proviso, the 2011 CBA provides in Article 46 that any dispute involving a fine or
suspension imposed upon a player for on‐field conduct, or, more broadly, “for
conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of
professional football,” is expressly withdrawn from impartial arbitration.85
In lieu of recourse to an independent arbitrator to review the discipline, the NFLPA
agreed that Commissioner discipline imposed under Article 46 is instead reviewed
by an appeal to the Commissioner, who would designate a hearing officer. There is
no bar to the Commissioner serving as the hearing officer, and in fact that procedure
is most often the practice. Consequently, in many cases the Commissioner appoints
himself as the hearing officer to review his own decision, with the power to “render
a written decision which will constitute full, final and complete disposition of the
dispute and will be binding” upon all parties. No legal standard for the “hearing
officer’s” review of the initial discipline is stated in Article 46.86
Article 46 as written demonstrates an intent to exclude “best interest” player
discipline from independent arbitration. This election is not unusual; many labor
agreements choose to designate certain matters as within management’s
prerogative, or to delegate certain types of grievances to management/labor
committees, or other internally structured non‐independent hearing committees.
While these procedures are appropriate and common, they should not be
mistakenly lumped with decisions made by independent arbitrators.87
employee of the Rams and other clubs. However, more careful analysis reveals that Kerr does not
really address the same issues we discuss in this Article. First, the issue goes to the Commissioner’s
power to arbitrate disputes between clubs and employees, not the Commissioner’s unique power to
discipline misconduct detrimental to the “best interests” of football. Second, the court emphasized, in
concluding the provision was unconscionable, that the contract term was presented in take‐it‐or‐
leave‐it fashion to an unsophisticated single employee. The court’s reasoning makes it clear that the
court’s conclusion would not necessarily apply to a reasoned decision by a highly sophisticated
union, with a veteran executive director and skilled legal counsel, to accept the Commissioner’s
authority to impose discipline without resort to an independent arbitrator.
84 NFL CBA, Art. 43, sec. 1.
85 NFL CBA, Art. 46, sec. 1(a).
86 In the Ray Rice arbitration, supra note __, an independent arbitrator was appointed as the hearing
officer. She noted the lack of a review standard in Article 46. Reasoning from the other sections of
the CBA that did utilize an arbitrator, she determined that her standard of review, sitting in the place
of the Commissioner, should be “arbitrary and capricious,” as opposed to “just cause”. See also text
accompanying notes __‐__, infra.
87 Consistent with the parties’ intent, the NFL‐CBA does not refer to the Article 46 process as an
“arbitration,” but instead describes the process of review by a hearing officer as an “appeal.” Further,
the Article’s language does not apply the label of “arbitrator” to the hearing officer.
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Under our system of labor law encouraging voluntary agreement by the parties, this
negotiated departure from the reliance on an independent arbitrator utilized
throughout the rest of the CBA is totally appropriate. The negotiation clearly
reflects the union’s judgment that other CBA provisions are more meaningful to
their constituency.88 The parties are also free to agree on an express standard of
review of the Commissioner’s decision through careful and appropriate drafting of
the CBA’s text. However, in lieu of such drafting, our concern is that the NFLPA, the
NFL and the courts consistently utilize the traditional review standard designed for
an independent arbitrator articulated under the FAA and the LMRA. These
workable and effective standards are premised on the independence and expertise
of a neutral arbitator. They are ill‐suited for reviewing the unique “best interest”
decisions of a sports league commissioner.
The NFL’s Article 46 procedure introduces no independent center of review that is
fundamental to the Steelworkers’ policy. The Article 46 discipline is imposed by the
Commissioner, and appealed to the Commissioner. This form of governance
effectively restores the power the Commissioner originally enjoyed over all
stakeholders under private association law, and that has remained vested in the
Commissioner with regard to owners and employees not covered by the union CBA.
Because, with regard to actions taken pursuant to Article 46, the NFL more
resembles a private association, the appropriate standard of judicial review likewise
should be that of a private association.
Consider the “Deflategate” scandal where the NFL Commissioner found two club
employees had conspired with star quarterback Tom Brady to illegally deflate
footballs;89 suppose instead that Brady was not implicated, but instead the
Commissioner found that the employees had conspired with Patriots club President
Jonathan Kraft (son of owner Robert Kraft)? As noted above, without the overlay of
labor law, the Commissioner’s authority to impose discipline on anyone is subject to
judicial review under the law of private association. Under cases like Turner v.
Kuhn, Kraft could have challenged any punishment on grounds that the decision was
arbitrary and capricious, that it was contrary to existing NFL rules, or exceeded the
Commissioner’s authority. The only difference, in our view, between Kraft and
Brady is that Brady’s claim as a union worker would be filed in federal court and
determined under the federal common law, while Kraft’s claim would be
determined by the applicable state common law of private associations.
To be sure, sports leagues and their players could agree that unionized workers
waive rights they would otherwise have at common law to challenge the
Commissioner disciplinary decisions (presumably in return for other concessions
The relevant language of Article 46 is consistent with the language of previous NFL CBAs going
back to the first 1968 CBA dealing with Commissioner discipline under the “best interest” clause.
See note ___, supra.
89 The facts are recounted in Brady, supra, 820 F.3d at 532‐533.
88
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and protections in the CBA). Indeed, if they so chose, they could add the following
hypothetical provision:
The parties agree that the Commissioner’s decision shall be final with regard
to any determination arising under this section of the agreement, and
expressly state their intent that the matter shall not be subject to grievance by
the impartial arbitrator. Any judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision
shall be limited to determining whether the discipline drew its essence from
the authority delegated herein to the Commissioner, and the decision shall
only be overturned if a court determines that the Commissioner breached his
obligation under this agreement and instead imposed his own industrial brand
of justice.90
Although such a provision is permitted, it should not be encouraged. Judges are too
tempted to distort the Steelworkers Trilogy standard, designed properly for
impartial arbitration, when faced with a review by a management official. Nor are
there sound reasons of policy why, absent express language, the well‐developed
common law of private association that applies to owners and non‐union employees
should not also apply to decisions by Commissioners applicable to players.
For these reasons, the same technique of clear statement that led the Supreme Court
to presume that parties intend disputes to be arbitrated should be used to presume
that unionized employees (i.e., NFL players) do not have fewer rights for judicial
review of discipline than their non‐union colleagues in the workplace.
We acknowledge that, in many cases, judicial review under the law of private
associations and judicial review under the Steelworkers Trilogy will yield similar
results. Well‐reasoned judgments by a sports league commissioner that are faithful
to the league’s rules and precedents will be upheld under either standard. Decisions
that impose his personal brand of industrial justice rather than drawing their
essence from the CBA (subject to vacatur under labor arbitration rules) are likely to
be found arbitrary or contrary to league rules (subject to invalidation under private
association doctrine). Moreover, judges who themselves are tempted to impose
their own brand of justice can easily fulfill their formal responsibilities to follow
doctrine by pronouncing the correct labels. Thus, even though precedents applying
Steelworkers Trilogy make it clear that an arbitrator’s decision cannot be overturned
because in the reviewing court’s opinion the arbitrator misinterpreted the CBA,91 a
recent court of appeals vacated an award because the arbitrator’s misinterpretation
of “plain meaning” showed that the award did not draw its essence from the
contract.92 Alternatively, in the Finley case discussed above, if the court of appeals

Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194‐95 (7th Cir. 1987).
United States Soccer Fed'n, Inc. v. United States Nat'l Soccer Team Players Ass'n,
838 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2016).
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felt that the Commissioner’s act was unjust, they could have decided it was based on
malicious animosity, and reversed on that ground.
We therefore do not claim that any particular decision necessarily would have been
decided differently had the correct standard been used. However, the split panel
decision Brady suggests that the issues would have been considered and debated in
a different way, and the NFLPA might well have prevailed under the law of private
associations.93
Chief Judge Katzmann dissented in Brady, largely over the Commissioner’s failure to
reconcile the well‐established and relatively minor penalty for wide receivers using
improper “stickum” to give them an advantage in catching a football with what he
perceived was a similar offense in deflating a football to give a quarterback an
advantage in passing the ball. He wrote:
Precisely because of the severity of the penalty, one would have expected the
Commissioner to at least fully consider other alternative and collectively
bargained‐for penalties, even if he ultimately rejected them. Indeed, the CBA
encourages—though, as the majority observes, does not strictly require—the
Commissioner to fully explain his reasoning by mandating that he issue a
written decision when resolving an Article 46 appeal. That process is all the
more important when the disciplinary action is novel and the Commissioner's
reasoning is, as here, far from obvious.
Yet, the Commissioner failed to even mention, let alone explain, a highly
analogous penalty, an omission that underscores the peculiar nature of
Brady's punishment. The League prohibits the use of stickum, a substance that
enhances a player's grip. Under a collectively bargained‐for Schedule of Fines,
a violation of this prohibition warrants an $8,268 fine in the absence of
aggravating circumstances. Given that both the use of stickum and the
deflation of footballs involve attempts at improving one's grip and evading the
referees' enforcement of the rules, this would seem a natural starting point for
assessing Brady's penalty. Indeed, the League's justification for prohibiting
stickum—that it "affects the integrity of the competition and can give a team
an unfair advantage," —is nearly identical to the Commissioner's explanation
In Peterson, the other major recent decision, the principal ground of appeal was
that the Commissioner imposed a policy retroactively by issuing more severe
discipline than he had in prior cases. However, the designated NFL executive
charged with hearing the appeal, and the court of appeals, both recognized that the
Commissioner has broad discretion to increase penalties if prior penalties were
seen as ineffective. . Peterson, 831 F.3d at 992. Given the breadth of the
Commissioner’s best interests authority, see Milwaukee American Ass’n v. Landis, 49
F.2d 298, 299 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (parties intended Commissioner to be “proverbial
pater familias”), it would appear that the NFLPA would not have been successful had
they sought to challenge Peterson’s discipline under the law of private associations.
93
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for what he found problematic about the deflation—that it "reflects an
improper effort to secure a competitive advantage in, and threatens the
integrity of, the game."94
An impartial expert labor arbitrator is not bound by precedent and does not have to
explain any deviation from similar cases. That is because it is the arbitrator’s
judgment that has been bargained for by the parties. In contrast, under the law of
private association, those charged by the association’s governing documents with
internal decision making are obliged to both follow rules and do so in a way that is
not arbitrary. The law of private associations recognizes that non‐parties may be
subject to association rules, and judicial review to ensure consistent rule compliance
is therefore appropriate.95 For example, in Finley the court of appeals took note that
the Commissioner persuaded them that previously approved cash sales of players
were of a different quality and magnitude than the ones disapproved in the case sub
judice. Applying the labor arbitration model, in contrast, the majority in Brady
expressly noted that the CBA did not require the “arbitrator” to explain his
reasoning.96 The failure to explain why Brady’s misconduct was so much more
severe may well have persuaded one of the judges in the majority that
Commissioner Goodell’s decision was not consistent with league rules, even if his
overall judgment “drew its essence” from the CBA.
Another ground for appeal in Brady was the NFLPA’s claim that the published rules
specified that first offenses for equipment violations “will result in fines.”97 It
appears likely that Judge Parker’s majority decision rejected that claim on the
merits, because it emphasized that the rules document later states that suspensions
may also be imposed based on the circumstances.98 However, the opinion is not
clear on this point: it goes on to state that “even if other readings were plausible, the
Commissioner's interpretation of this provision as allowing for a suspension would
easily withstand judicial scrutiny because his interpretation would be at least
"barely colorable," which, again, is all that the law requires.”99 This seems to be a
correct way of re‐wording the “draws its essence from the contract” standard for
labor arbitrators. However, the law of private associations would not likely uphold
an official’s unpersuasive and unjustified interpretation simply because it was
“barely colorable.”
A final significant difference between judicial review under the Steelworkers Trilogy
and the law of private association concerns the appropriate standard of review, as a
matter of internal NFL “law,” that the Commissioner applies in reviewing his initial
decision. In three recent internal decisions under Article 46, the designated hearing
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officers used three different standards.100 In Bountygate,101 former Commissioner
Paul Tagliabue, acting as Hearing Officer, articulated a standard of “consistency of
treatment, uniformity of standards for parties similar situated and patent unfairness
or selectivity.” In Ray Rice,102 retired federal judge Barbara Jones, acting as Hearing
Officer, determined that the union had the burden of showing that the initial
discipline was “arbitrary and capricious.” In Peterson, NFL Labor Relations Vice
President Harold Henderson, acting as Hearing Officer, rejected the appeal on the
ground that “the player has not demonstrated that the process and procedures
surrounding his discipline were not fair and consistent.”103 The law of private
association would give a player seeking judicial review two alternative theories to
attack the Hearing Officer’s decision: (1) That it improperly affirmed an initial
disciplinary decision that was itself arbitrary and capricious, and (2) that the
Hearing Officer breached league rules by applying a standard that was markedly
different from pre‐existing association practice. It is not clear that there is a marked
difference between the three standards recently employed (although Tagliabue’s
articulation is arguably clearer and perhaps worthy of emulation). Consider the
possibility, however, that a subsequent hearing officer read the Peterson standard
articulated by Henderson narrowly, to provide review only for procedures, and not
the substance of the initial disciplinary decision. Under the law of private
association, we believe that a court would be justified in overturning a decision
where the Hearing Officer did not actually determine that the discipline was
consistent, with uniform standards for parties similarly situated, or did not consider
on the merits a player’s claim that he was the victim of patent unfairness or
selectivity. In both Brady and Peterson (Rice was not appealed), the appellate courts
disregarded the question whether the “arbitrator” applied the proper standard of
review for the hearing officer under Article 46. Absent a specific clear standard, an
impartial and expert labor arbitrator selected by the parties to resolve disputes is
free to select any standard, as long as it drew its essence from the contract. Under
the law of private associations, that question would be prominent for the reviewing
court.
CONCLUSION
For nearly six decades, federal courts have worked hard to develop a system that
facilitates peaceful resolution of industrial disputes through the designation of an
impartial expert to arbitrate disputes. To achieve this goal requires judges to
engage in uncommon self‐restraint, refusing to step in even when they perceive a
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legally‐trained tribune has erred in factual findings or legal conclusions. At the
same time, federal labor law promotes industrial harmony by allowing unions and
employers to make their own bargains, including the removal of disputes from
impartial arbitration. However, given the judicial and legislative preference for
arbitration, such an agreement must be express.
When the parties do expressly agree to resolve disputes by means other than
impartial labor arbitration, the question arises as to the appropriate standard of
review of that decision. We believe that the appropriate standard is the common
law baseline that would have existed were the employees not protected by a
collective bargaining agreement. Because employees involved in sports leagues
have no choice but to subject themselves to league rules, reviewing courts have
examined sports league decisions under the law of private associations, and have
insisted that league officials taking adverse action must act in conformance with the
authorized powers, consistently with league rules, and the decision must not be
arbitrary or capricious.
Applying the standards of review appropriate for an expert impartial arbitrator to a
management decision expressly withdrawn from arbitration is not appropriate. It
creates the anomalous situation where a non‐union employee’s common law rights
might exceed those of a unionized worker. More significantly, it risks distorting the
law of labor arbitral review, because of judges’ inevitable tendency to view a
management decision differently. To be sure, union representatives and
management executives are free to impose whatever standard they want, regardless
of what others may think, but if they are going to adopt a standard designed for
other purposes, they should have to do so expressly. Absent such an express
incorporation of Steelworkers Trilogy language into a standard of review of a matter
withdrawn from arbitration, challenges to Commissioner’s decisions should proceed
to federal court under section 301 of the LMRA under the common law standard of
the law of private associations.

